The quality of the assessment of real needs in the Member States is low, and the alternative solution of upgrading existing conventional lines is not often given due consideration, even though the savings achieved when this option is used can be significant. This means a low EU added value of the EU co-funding of high-speed rail infrastructure investments. This patchwork system has been constructed without proper coordination across borders: high-speed lines crossing national borders are not amongst the national priorities for construction, even though international agreements have been signed and provisions have been included in the TEN-T Regulation requiring core network corridors to be built by 2030. As a result, there is only a patchwork of national high-speed lines, planned and built by the Member States in isolation. There is no European high-speed rail network, and the Commission has no legal tools and no powers in the decision making to ensure that Member States make rapid progress towards completing the core network corridors set out in the TEN-T Regulation. On average, it takes around 16 years for new high-speed lines to proceed from the start of works to the beginning of operations. Although the length of the national high-speed rail networks is growing, the Commission’s 2011 target of tripling the number of kilometres of high-speed rail lines by 2030 will not be reached: 9 000 km of high-speed line are currently in use, and around 1 700 km of line was under construction in 2017. ![]() We found that the EU’s current long-term plan is not supported by credible analysis, is unlikely to be achieved, and lacks a solid EU-wide strategic approach. We carried out our audit in six Member States, analysing expenditure for more than 5 000 km of infrastructure on ten high-speed rail lines and four border crossings, covering around 50 % of the high-speed rail lines in Europe. We carried out a performance audit on the long-term strategic planning of high-speed lines in the EU, on the cost-efficiency (assessing construction costs, delays, cost overruns and the use of high-speed lines which received EU co-funding), and on the sustainability and EU added value of EU co-funding. Since 2000, the EU has provided 23.7 billion euro of co-funding to support high-speed rail infrastructure investments. It brings environmental performance and socio-economic benefits which can support the EU’s transport and cohesion policy objectives. High-speed rail is a comfortable, safe, flexible and environmentally sustainable mode of transport. ![]() Moreover, nine out of 14 lines and stretches have insufficient high numbers of passengers, and 11 000 national rules still exist, although the Court already asked in 2010 to lift these technical and administrative barriers. Sustainability is low, effectiveness of the investments is lacking and EU added value is at risk with three out of seven completed lines having low passenger numbers leading to a high risk of ineffective spending of €2.7 billion EU co-funding. Cost-efficiency is at stake, because not everywhere very high speed lines are needed, as the cost per minute of saved travel time is very high, going up to €369 million, and as the average speeds only amount to 45 % of the maximum capacity, while cost overruns and construction delays are the norm rather than the exception. There is no realistic long term EU plan for high speed rail, but an ineffective patchwork of national lines not well linked since the European Commission has no legal tools and no powers to force Member States to build lines as agreed. ![]() ![]() A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an ineffective patchworkĪbout the report Since 2000, the EU has been investing €23.7 billion into high speed rail infrastructure.
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